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Abstract
This research examines the relative strength and significance of the
status of "incumbent contractor" in Federal computer procurement. It
statistically measures the relationship between vendor selection and
previous user experience for a sample of commercial mainframe computer
system acquisitions by federal agencies in the 1970s. This research shows
that while incumbency may be important, compatibility between existing and
proposed systems is as influential.
IBM's experience provides an interesting illustration of this thesis.
IBM seems to get less advantage from being an incumbent than its rivals, a
trend that suggests that procurement was systematically biased against IBM.
However, new evidence shows that IBM's disadvantage is largely due to
incompatibilities in IBM's product line. This result, while not surprising
to anyone who has followed the literature on switching costs, is still
quite significant. It is the first econometric measurement of the
competitive effects of incompatibility. This evidence also shapes the
interpretation of the effect of the computer procurement regulations on
commercial mainframe procurement, suggesting that the procurement oversight
system was less harmful than previously thought.
Introduction.
Economists have made many theoretical gains in understanding the
economics of procurement. Yet, researchers have produced few empirical
studies to complement these theoretical developments. A number of recent
quantitative analyses of micro-level procurement data have tried to fill
this void, but many important product markets and economic issues remain
unexamined.
One area that has not been examined is the relative strength and
significance of the status of "incumbent contractor" for Federal
procurement decisions. Though there are many theoretical reasons for
incumbent vendors to possess competitive advantages over inexperienced
rivals, opinions differ widely about the actual magnitude of the advantages
from incumbency. Little empirical research has attempted to address this
topic.
This research statistically measures the relationship between vendor
selection and previous user experience for a sample of commercial mainframe
computer system acquisitions by federal agencies in the 1970s. This
research shows that while incumbency may be important, many other factors
are as influential. Of particular note, compatibility between existing
systems and potential replacements helps contribute to a vendor's
advantage. Compatibility is distinct from incumbency since a computer
vendor can market either a line of fully compatible systems or not. As this
paper argues, this result has important implications for interpretations of
the effects of oversight on computer procurement. In contrast to previous
research, it suggests that oversight by an external agency was less harmful
to incumbent vendors than previously thought.
IBM's experiences with Federal agencies provide an interesting
illustration of this thesis. Initial results show that IBM frequently
failed to benefit from its incumbent status, consistent with previous
research arguing that the oversight system was biased against IBM. However,
new evidence shows that a large part of the tendency for former IBM users
to switch to other vendors arose primarily from the fact that limited
compatible upgrades were available for users of very old IBM equipment
(e.g. IBM 1400 series). Federal buyers who previously used IBM equipment
and could upgrade to a new compatible system (e.g IBM360/370) tended to
choose IBM as often as users of other vendors selected those vendors again.
As with all empirical research on "lock-in" effects, the effects of
lock-in are not directly measured. The degree of lock-in can never truly be
identified, because it is nearly impossible to distinguish between the
economic, institutional, and spurious statistical factors that together
produce a correlation between an observed vendor choice and a user's
historical choices. In the presence of such an identification problem, all
possible interpretations that are consistent with the observed patterns of
behavior are equally likely.
This paper takes a novel approach to this problem. It uses technical
compatibility as one measure of the influence of a buyer's experience on
vendor choice. This is reasonable, because compatibility between an
existing system and a potential replacement is believed to contribute to
lock-in effects (David and Greenstein, 1990) . However, because little
empirical work has examined this belief in depth (See David, 1985,
Greenstein 1990) , the paper must develop both an appropriate model and
appropriate measures.
This paper presents estimates from a multi-nomial logit model that
summarizes agency behavior. This statistical model predicts which of the
five largest computer mainframe vendors an agency's office chose based on
its installed base of systems. The probability that a procurement would be
won by an incumbent vendor is made a function of historical factors such as
(a) the presence of a vendor at an agency's office, (b) measures of the
extent of that presence (the size of the installed base) , and (c) measures
of the differences in the "preferences" of agencies for different vendors.
Measures of the influence of compatibility are then added to this basic
model. This model's results are the first econometric analysis of the
relevance of compatibility for vendor choice.
The paper is also novel for its detailed examination of the federal
computer procurement. Computer systems are important for virtually all
government activity. However, until recently, computer procurement was
difficult to analyze, because acquisitions were spread out over many years
and many agencies, and were thus difficult to observe systematically2 . The
creation of a sample of observations of commercial mainframe computer
acquisitions by federal agency work sites from 1972 to 1983 has now made
such analysis possible. 3
The paper first discusses the economic and institutional factors
affecting the relationship between incumbency and vendor choice. Next it
develops a model and addresses measurement issues. The final part of the
paper interprets the estimation results.
II. Vendor selection and Bureaucratic Conflict
A. Economic factors affecting procurement
Though every procurement varies from the next, most acquisitions tend
to follow a set of stages. 4 In the first stage, an agency defines its needs
and secures funding for its planned acquisition. Next, agencies and
industry representatives negotiate over benchmarks and technical
requirements in the requests for bids. Then bids are formally requested,
evaluated and awarded. The vendor that offers the system that best meets
the stated needs at the lowest price is awarded the contract. In the final
stages, losing bidders may file protests and potentially start the process
again somewhere in the middle.
Incumbents should have an economic advantage in this process if buyers
incur many switching costs. Non-incumbent vendors are usually required to
meet explicitly in their bids the costs of switching to the incompatible
product. There are a variety of bidding assessment procedures possible (OSD
1980, 1981). Either (1) the incompatible non-incumbent vendor adds a cost
(estimated by people within the government) to the overall price of his bid
and the agency arranges for the conversion (either through contractors or
in-house conversion), or (2) the vendors accept some responsibility for
uncovered portions of switching costs, either up to the level estimated or
based on their own estimates. Because of the difficulties and risks
associated with outside conversion contracts, agencies typically use the C
first procedure. 5 In other words, the incumbent bids P, and the buyer pays
P, , while the non-incumbent bids P
N
and the buyer pays P
N
plus some
switching cost. 6 The first switching costs must also be implicitly covered
by a non-incumbent when agencies write strict compatibility requirements
into the technical specifications requesting a bid, also advantages
incumbents.
Due to switching costs, previous experience with a vendor should
positively predict future purchases from the same vendor. Yet, this is not
the only reason for incumbency to predict future vendor choice. If a
particular vendor continues to be the best at providing a system which
satisfies the user's unique needs, then the user is likely to choose that
vendor again. Indeed, a vendor may learn from previous experience with a
user about special features of the customer, which provides him an
advantage in putting together his proposal. In sum, previous vendor-buyer
interaction is a good predictor of subsequent procurement choice for two
reasons, switching costs and satisfactory previous experience.
B. Bureaucratic conflict
Although it seems that incumbency should predict subsequent vendor
choice, the relationship between incumbency and outcomes is complicated by
the inherent conflicts over procurement between an agency and Congress
(Greenstein 1989) . The criteria that an agency uses to evaluate the systems
of competing vendor do not always reflect congressional priorities,
especially budget priorities. Because capital budgets are not fungible
across projects, the value of the dollar within the capital budget need not
correspond to the marginal evaluation of a dollar within an agency's
operating budget. Moreover, Congress assigns agencies tasks and duties, but
those who work within the agency may prioritize these activities
•
differently, particularly when a computer system shapes an office's general
working conditions. Disagreement typically arises over whether the
government is in the market for the computer-equivalent of a "Chevrolet or
a Cadillac" (Kelman, 1990, page 20-26) . Hence, even if the marginal value
of the capital budget dollar were the same, an agency's evaluation of the
marginal worth of competing system features is likely to diverge from that
of Congress ' .
Partially in response to these differences in incentives Congress
established an oversight process for computer procurement. Agencies can be
spared any oversight, as for acquisitions of low value, or the General
Services Administration (GSA) , can tightly circumscribe the procurement
process, as authorized under the Brooks Act (1965), Public law 36-809. The
typical procurement for a mainframe will consist of agency decision-making
subject to oversight approval. The influence of oversight will depend on
the success of the strategies used by agencies and oversight committees to
achieve control over vendor selection (Greenstein ,1989).
There is some reason to believe that non-incumbents may have been
favored in a tightly supervised bid relative to an unsupervised
procurement. GSA competitive procedures were allegedly more price-sensitive
than those of agencies and focused only on necessary functions of the
desired system. They did not give much weight to subjective estimates of
intangible benefits, such as future support, upgrades, servicing
reliability and most important, conversion expenses. It was commonly
believed that strict GSA procedures did not systematically account for the
long-term or short term costs of converting software from an old to a new
manufacturer. Agencies saw this as a potentially costly oversight that
resulted in "unnecessary switching." 10 A well-known contrary opinion argued
that accounting for switching costs too easily restricted competition. 11
On average, absolute control over vendor selection did not lie with
either agency or overseer. In practice, the oversight agency is not
omnipotent, because it does not have a sufficient number of personnel to
regulate all acquisitions effectively (Werling 1983). Nor are agency
actions always rubber-stamped by the oversight personnel.
If an agency entirely controls vendor choice, then incumbency should
predict vendor choice fairly well. However, an especially effective
oversight system could partially weaken the relevance of switching costs
for procurement decisions, reducing the links between incumbency and future
vendor choice.
C. IBM and the Brooks Act
Congressional intervention allegedly influenced the enforcement of
procedures to the disadvantage of some vendors. It was widely believed that
a member (and eventual chairman) of the House Government Operations
Committee (HGOC) , Congressman Jack Brooks (D-Texas) , especially favored
vendors other than IBM and that he monitored a procurement more closely
when IBM was involved, especially in an uncompetitive procurement. 12 As
Werling said in his study:
"Within the Federal ADP (automatic data processing) community it
has been common knowledge that the HGOC would delay procurement
for ADPE (automatic data processing equipment) ordered from IBM
if at all possible." (pg. 262)
In Werling 's view, the cost to the agency's office of purchasing IBM
equipment increased, because of the extra procedural burden imposed on the
acquisition of IBM equipment. By making IBM less attractive, the agency
oversight process should have reduced IBM's advantage as incumbent. Thus,
incumbency should not predict vendor choice for IBM as well as for other
incumbent vendors.
IV. A simple measure of the advantages of incumbency
An examination of sales figures and buyer loyalty rates provides an
overview of patterns in vendor choice and highlights some of its puzzles,
•
This analysis will show that on average incumbency predicts vendor choice,
as expected. In addition, it establishes that IBM's sales history with the
Federal government is puzzling. IBM is dominant in private industry, but
not nearly so with Federal buyers. Moreover, an unusually high percentage
of Federal agency offices who formerly used IBM make their next purchase
from another vendor. However, because this simple analysis is limited, it
motivates use of the multi-nomial logit analysis in the next section.
With notable exceptions, a majority of government agencies use
commercial mainframes for much the same tasks as their private industry
counterparts (NBS (1981) , ch. 4) . To facilitate comparison between Federal
agency computer system use and private industry computer system use,
exceptions must be identified. The analysis below applies to standardized
systems that perform functions not unique to government, i.e. systems in
private use and government use that perform the same basic tasks. Exclusion
of systems labelled "special government design" and inclusion of models
found in contemporary private industry mainframe computer censuses take
care of most of the relevant cases. 1 I call the included group
"commercially available general purpose" (CAGP) systems.
Table 1 presents the system stock for CAGP systems. IBM dominates the
Federal stock of systems early in the decade, as Federal agencies inherited
purchases made from the two early leaders in mainframe computers in the
1960s, IBM and Univac. The trends across the decade resemble those of an
earlier (Werling 1983) analysis of a similar sample of "general management
class" systems: IBM's share of a (roughly) fixed number of mainframe
systems in stock falls throughout the decade. Of course, there are many
possible explanations for this trend. 14
A history of computer system acquisitions was constructed by comparing
successive years of federal inventories at agency offices. 15 This removed
the effect of retirements, which are probably the least accurately recorded
element in the inventory. 16 Table 2 presents the rather surprising results
of this effort. Contrary to its performance in the private sector, IBM does
not display dominant sales figures for this set of general purpose
mainframe computer systems among federal buyers. While IBM certainly is the
largest supplier over the entire period, there are many years in which it
is not the largest.
c
Table 3 demonstrates another difference between federal and the
private sector buying patterns. In the private sector surveys, IBM loyalty
is consistently highest, in the sense that a small percentage of IBM users
leave IBM. IBM users and buyers typically displayed 90 percent loyalty
rates and all other vendors regularly displayed rates of 60 percent to 80
percent in International Data Corporation's (IDC) "Loyalty Surveys." 17 As
in the private sector surveys, the table examines sites with a single
system vendor prior to the observed acquisition. As in those surveys,
incumbency tends to be a good predictor of future choice. Yet, what is
striking about the table is that IBM does not have the highest loyalty
rates. In fact, the firm's sites come no where near their numbers in the
private sector during this period.
Without more information about Federal procurement, the three tables
together are puzzling. Federal users made heavier investments in IBM in the
1960s that in the 1970s, while most private buyers continued to use IBM. It
is surprising that two sets of buyers of essentially the same category of
systems for the same type of applications displayed parallel behavior in
the 1960s, but not a decade and a half later.
The information presented in Table 3 complicates the puzzle, but does
not solve it. Many factors influence vendor choice in addition to factors
associated with incumbency. If one controls for buyer preferences, for
example, incumbency may not be such a good predictor of winning a
procurement. Thus, an empirical framework that accounts for many of the
additional factors at work is warranted. A multi-nomial model provides that
framework.
V. The Structure Behind the Measurement
4
The statistical model presented below provides a more sophisticated
analysis of the data presented in Table 3 -- more sophisticated in the
sense that it controls for some of the variety of circumstances that
influence vendor choice but typically differ among buyers. This empirical
model will focus on the relationship between previous buyer experience and
vendor choice and try to measure those factors that predict the vendor
chosen by an agency.
A. The structure of the model
All computer buyers associate some utility with each vendor, U-.
,
where utility takes the form of random utility model, \J-
}
= u
rj + e r where
vendors are indexed by j and an acquisition by i. Since it is impossible to
identify the individual responsible for choosing a system, a random utility
model offers a plausible and useful, if somewhat sweeping, representation
of the mix of deterministic and random factors which normally affect
decision making in the bidding process. The deterministic component, u-.,
represent previous agency-vendor interaction, the relative preference of
agencies for particular vendors, and other market factors influencing the
evaluation of vendors. The stochastic element, e--, represents
idiosyncratic political events, the peculiarities of decision-makers and
other unsystematic unobserved elements of the process. For example, we do
not observe whether an acquisition is a replacement acquisition, an
expansion of existing systems, or an initial acquisition for a new program.
Previous experience with a vendor influences vendor choice to different
degrees in the three types of acquisitions. Inability to distinquish
between these different types of acquisitions will produce measurement
error.
It is well known (e.q. Amemiya, ch. 9) that if and only if the random
components are independent and distributed f (€,-.-) = exp(-exp(-e,j) ) , then
the probability that a buyer will prefer vendor number 1 over all other
vendors must be
(l) Pr,.(l) = Pr(Un > u i2 , u f1 > u j3 ,...)
= exp(u
f1
)/[S
fj expCUjj) ] ,
where 2, Pr
f
(j) = l by design, and j = 1, 2, 3, and so on. A similar
equation describes the probability of choosing any other vendor. Equation
(1) is useful, because it shows how different deterministic factors
influence the probability of choosing any vendor. Once the ur are made a
function of observable determinants, the likelihood function for equation
(1) is then given by
(2) Loglikelihood = S. E, Y fj*log { Z k [exp(u ik - u^.)]"
1
},
where Y-- is an indicator variable for the observed choice and where the
functional form for u
tJ
. is yet to be determined. The plausibility of the
distributional assumptions on €•• is discussed below, but the primary
reason for using this distribution is that it yields closed-form solutions
which are computationally feasible.
A vector of factors will measure heterogeneity in the extent of
previous buyer-vendor interaction. These are called X--. Another vector of
factors measures heterogeneity in buyer characteristics, which are presumed
to predilect a buyer towards a particular vendor. These are called Z
f
. The
exact variables measuring X-- and Z- are specified in the next section. The
evaluation of a vendor is given by
(3) u fJ = a + XUB + Z.6r
Equation (3) implies that maximizing (2) will yield estimates for the
vector 3 and for the matrix (<S- - <S ) (for all j except 0), where choice
is serves as a base choice. Since /3 indicates something about the
relationship between previous buyer-seller interaction and vendor choice,
the discussion will generally focus on the signs of the estimates of 6.
10
The model implicitly assumes that the more a buyer has invested with
one supplier in the past the more likely that buyer is to purchase from the
same supplier in the future. This simply assumes that a buyer has
repeatedly expressed his preferences for a particular supplier in the past,
by investing in that supplier. This could be because there are costs to
switching to alternative vendors (Greenstein 1989, ch. 2), or because one
particular vendor has consistently satisfied the buyer's needs. Since the
buyer's preference for a vendor will be partially accounted for by the Z-,
X-- can either correlate with switching costs or reflect an unobserved and
unmeasured preference for an incumbent.
The model also assumes that investments with supplier j do not affect
the systematic component of the utility the buyer gets from a system from
supplier k. This means that if X,^- measures the observed stock of equipment
a buyer possesses from vendor j before acquiring a new computer system then
the coefficient estimate on this X- . measures the relative weight in the
buyer's preferences for a new system from vendor j and no other vendor.
This second assumption is innocuous so long as competing vendors market
incompatible systems, which is almost always true in the sample examined in
the text. More will be said about this below.
It is operationally convenient to restrict attention to acquisitions
by users who had systems from no more than one vendor prior to the new
acquisition. This allows attributes of an incumbent's advantages to be
given to a single vendor. A secondary benefit derives from the elimination
of large government installations (e.g. Los Alomos and Livermore) , where
most of the compatible systems from different vendors end up (e.g. Amdahl
and IBM) . By eliminating these sites, we temporarily avoid many of the
problems associated with violating the assumption that one vendor's
installed base does not affect the buyer's evaluation of another vendor.
Developing an appropriate specification for this case is a task for later
work.
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At single vendor sites, when X,-, is composed only of measures of the
previous stock of equipment, equation (3) can be rewritten as follows:
(4) If j is the incumbent then u r = a + X-B + Z6-,
If j is the incumbent then u jk = a + Z i <5 k' k ^ J*
In other words, when the buyer is evaluating all suppliers prior to his
observed choice, previous investment with a vendor gives the vendor an
extra advantage if /3 is positive. Of course, equation (4) will look
slightly different when X-. are not entirely a function of the previous
stock of equipment, but the principle still holds.
In order to focus on the distinctiveness of buyer-vendor relationships
when IBM is the incumbent, buyers are assumed to weigh equally similar
previous experience with all the vendors except IBM. This assumption
yields:
(5) If IBM is the incumbent, then u
rj
= a + X.
}
(R + G) + Z
i
6
j
, j = IBM.
Equation (5) introduces the vector 9, which measures the extent to which
incumbency influences IBM to a degree different from the other vendors.
The statistical model in equations (1), (2), (3), (4), and (5) is
sufficient for the task at hand. It provides a reduced form measurement of
the advantages attributable to incumbency. The model does not rely on very
specific assumptions about vendor-bidder interactions. This parsimony is by
choice, not necessity. It is possible to make this measurement consistent
with a class of standard vendor-bidding models, but such consistency is not
essential. An example is presented in the appendix.
B. What hypotheses can be tested?
Estimates of the coefficients in equations (1) , (2) , and (3) and (4)
and (5) shed light on some, but not all, of the hypotheses of interest.
There is still an unavoidable identification problem.
12
There are three possible interpretations for an estimate of (3 when
that estimate is positive, that is, when incumbency predicts vendor choice:
(1) Conversion expenses are high and influence vendor choice in a majority
of cases, while procurement oversight does not diminish the importance of
incumbency. (2) Conversion expenses are not high and do not influence
vendor choice in a majority of cases, but agencies tend to use the same
vendors repeatedly. In this case, the measures of buyer heterogeneity do
not measure without error the reasons for buyer choices. Thus, previous
buyer choices correlate with the unmeasured preferences for the incumbent.
(3) Conversion expenses are high and influence vendor choice in a majority
of cases, but oversight tends to diminish the importance of these expenses
greatly. Nevertheless, the same vendors repeatedly win procurement from the
same agencies, and the measures of buyer heterogeneity do not measure the
reasons for buyer choices without error. Thus, previous buyer choice once
again correlates with unmeasured preferences. There is no way to
distinguish among these three explanations without more information.
Now consider the possible explanations for an estimate of (3 when that
estimate is zero. This can occur for two reasons: (1') Conversion expenses
are high and would influence vendor choice in the absence of oversight, but
tended not to do so in this sample because the oversight process weakened
the links between incumbency and vendor choice. (2
'
) Conversion expenses
are not often very high and do not tend to influence vendor choice in this
product market.
Clearly there are more interpretations than parameters to estimate. At
best, any estimate will confirm or reject one of a group of
interpretations. The consequences of switching costs for vendor choice
cannot be distinguished from unmeasured buyer satisfaction with incumbent
vendors, or from the influence of the procurement system.
The hypothesis concerning IBM will also be tested within this
framework. The estimates for the parameter 6, combined with the results for
13
(3, should narrow the list of possible interpretations of the relationship
between incumbency and vendor choice. If the links between incumbency and
vendor choice are weaker for IBM than for any other vendor, then 6 <
whenever (3 > . If IBM is not different from any other vendor, then 9
should be zero. All these interpretations are summarized in Table 4.
VI. Measures and Weights
c
This section provides details about the variables used to measure
incumbent installed base and buyer characteristics. A definition of the
variables and their predicted sign in the market model is included in Table
5. A table of the means, standard deviations, minimums and maximums is
included in Table 6 for general information.
A. X .
-
, Previous buyer-incumbent interaction
The Xjj should predict future vendor choice, because they reflect some
switching costs or unmeasured preference of a buyer for the incumbent
vendor.
Previous investment with a supplier's equipment. The greater a site's
commitment to an existing stock of equipment, the more difficulty the site
potentially faces when replacing old equipment. This variable takes on the
book value of owned equipment on site, adjusted for changing producer
prices.
Total computing capacity. This variable equals the number of commercially
available general purpose systems on site weighted by the average system
size. It is expected that the larger the capacity of the site, the greater
the investment in system and applications software, and the less
flexibility in buying replacements. This measure is highly correlated (.9)
with the total number of systems on site.
14
Incumbency in providing a system. This dummy variable indicates whether a
seller has ever sold a system to a site before. This dummy differs from
measures of the extent of incumbency because it captures the extent to
which having a system at a location, regardless of its size, predicts
future selection of that incumbent.
Minimum age of a system. This variable equals the age of the youngest
system a buyer possesses, and should indicate whether the user has had
recent experience with a supplier. It is often stated that a user is
hesitant to switch to a non-incumbent just after he has honed his skills
with a supplier's new equipment, but is more willing to leave an older and
possibly technically less-advanced system. 18
An IBM interaction effect. All the above variables interact with an IBM
dummy to estimate 6. This results in four new coefficient estimates.
B. X . . Vendor traits applied to all firms.
Incumbency in any form. One variable indicates whether a seller has ever
sold any computer equipment to a site prior to the sale of this machine.
This experience should give the seller some advantage in knowing how to
satisfy the personnel's needs at the site, although less than if the seller
had provided a system to the site. Since this variable is one for IBM at
virtually every site, there was nothing to be learned through interaction
with an IBM dummy.
Percentage of systems in a market segment. From 1976 to 1983, International
data corporation (IDC) classified general purpose computer systems into six
categories according to market size groupings. Each group was composed of
systems which compete against one another. 19 This variable equals the total
number of systems offered by each vendor, as counted by IDC, divided by the
total number offered by all vendors. The 1976 counts were applied to
observations from earlier years.
15
There are several reasons why the coefficient on the percentage of
systems offered by a vendor should be positive: (1) The greater the number
(and hence, percentage) of systems offered by a supplier, the more likely a
vendor offers something close to a buyer's needs which another seller
cannot match. (2) In long run equilibrium, sellers will enter with an ever(
widening product line into market segments in which they excel and will
stay out of market segments in which they do not excel. Hence, a higher
percentage of systems offered by a seller may proxy for success with
private industry buyers in a market segment. Greater success with private
industry buyers should predict success with the federal government,
especially if federal buyers are using the systems for the same purposes as
private industry. (3) If federal procurement procedures were poorly
administered, then the success of suppliers may be close to being random.
In that case, it would not be surprising if the probability of success is
proportional to the extent of entry into the supply of alternative systems,
irrespective of the identity of supplier.
C. Z
f
, Buyer characteristics that reflect preferences
The coefficients on these variables are not the focus of the
estimation, but it is important to specify these variables for two reasons.
First, it is necessary to control for some obvious differences in types of
computer buyers and their requests. Second, the coefficients are of some
inherent interest, because there exists no previous econometric work on
computer vendor choice. The following were used:
Dedicated application (versus general management class) . General management
systems are a class of systems familiar to most people: the hardware is
used as a "platform" for a variety of ever-changing programming activities.
In contrast, some dedicated applications are so specialized that some
• 20
suppliers ought to have more "off-the-shelf" alternatives than others.
Thus, we would expect that demand for a system to perform a dedicated
application should affect the probability that a vendor will bid.
•
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Multi processor systems (versus single processor systems) . Some systems
have more than one processor working together at least part of the time or
remote units interacted with the main processor. I hypothesize that multi-
processor systems are specialized configurations of computer eguipment and
certain suppliers should be better providers of them than others.
Acquired system's size. Some sellers are better at making larger systems
than smaller systems. This may not be captured by the measurement of supply
characteristics.
Department of Defense. Dummies were included for each of the military
branches to test a general perception that particular branches of the
military tended to favor certain vendors. However, this interpretation must
be cautiously applied to this sample since special military applications
were eliminated from the sample.
Previous investment with processors. One variable equals the number of
processors in stock at the installation in the year prior to the
acquisition, with no weight given for size or manufacturer. 21 This variable
correlates with the number of systems, except at sites that have processors
for tasks other than mainframe work. Sites with many processors employ more
technically advanced personnel and tend to use many small processors for
simple process control work in scientific applications. As a result, they
need less commercially packaged software. Vendors offering large system
support may be favored at sites that do not have scientific applications.
VII. The sample of acquisitions
The unit of observation is an observed acquisition at a Federal agency
office, as in table 3. However, the econometric estimation is performed on
a slightly different sample than that examined in Table 3. First, it
includes acquisitions from sites where there was no system prior to the
acquisition. These observations yield information about situations in which
switching costs are low. Second, it excludes certain observations for
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several reasons. Not all the acquisitions at single-vendor sites could be
coded with the supply variables. IDC provides size estimates for most
commercial general purpose mainframes, but not for minicomputers -- even
those performing mainframe-like general purpose functions. Since the data
are unavailable, minicomputer acquisitions were excluded from the sample (
used in the econometric estimates.
Acquisitions from several firms also had to be excluded because of
insufficient observations to estimate the parameters associated with that
option. Purchases of Amdahl, Cray, Dec, and NCR could not be included in
the sample for this reason. Due to the experiment design, acquisitions at
sites where these firms had been incumbents also had to be excluded. What
remained were purchases from the five largest incumbent firms, Burroughs,
Control Data, Honeywell, IBM, and Sperry-Univac and two smaller firms,
General Electric and RCA.
It should be noted that since all observations are comprised of
purchases, we also implicitly exclude observations where users choose to
not purchase or to purchase outside the class of commercial general purpose
systems. Hence, all inferences must be conditional on observing any
purchase of a mainframe at all.
Acquisitions of systems designed by General Electric (GE) or RCA, or
acquisitions at sites that contained only GE and RCA systems present a
potentially troublesome coding problem. Both these firms left the computer
industry just before the beginning of the sample period and sold their
operations to rival concerns (Honeywell and Sperry-Univac, respectively)
.
As a result, the econometrician is faced with both a substantive problem
and with an analogous coding problem. There are defensible reasons to
consider relabelling systems originally designed by GE and RCA as now
belonging to the larger firms, particularly since both Honeywell and RCA
continued to operate these divisions successfully after acquisition
(Fisher, McKie and Mancke, 1983) . Such a move might then correctly capture
a buyer purchasing a Honeywell machine because of a previous investment ^
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with GE. Similarly for RCA and Univac.
To test for the ( ir) relevance of this coding problem, the following
four samples were used: (1) An observation are excluded if the incumbent or
the acguisition are from systems originally coded as designed by GE or RCA.
(2) A system is excluded if GE or RCA is an incumbent, but not if GE or RCA
are the manufacturer of the acquired system. In the latter case, GE is
relabelled as a Honeywell purchase and RCA as a Univac Purchase. (3) A
system is excluded if a GE or RCA system has been acquired, but not if GE
and RCA are incumbents. In the latter case, GE incumbents are relabeled as
Honeywell incumbents and RCA incumbents are relabelled as Univac
incumbents. (4) All RCA incumbents and purchases are relabelled as Univac,
and all GE incumbents and purchases are relabelled as Honeywell. Everything
is included in the sample. 22 In the tables of estimates, the different
samples will be labelled 1 through 4.
One other consideration should be mentioned. It is well known that
multinomial logit models possess a property known as "Independence from
Irrelevant Alternatives" (IIA) , which is violated if the choices possess
very similar attributes. On this point several things should be said: (1)
IIA would most probably be violated under the present specification if
Amdahl and IBM were both included in the sample since Amdahl's hardware is
virtually a duplicate of IBM's. Fortunately, in this time period, Amdahl
sales comprised such a minuscule portion of the sample, that this seems to
be a small concern. 23 (2) Similar issues arise concerning systems designed
by IBM's competitors, principally RCA's Spectra series, which were
compatible with the IBM system-360. There were fourteen acquisitions of
this model series in the sample, six of which occurred at sites where IBM
was incumbent. Of eleven sites where RCA was the incumbent, only two
acquired systems from the IBM 360 family. If this problem influences the
estimates in practice, then it will be revealed in the estimates using
different samples. 24 However, because the sample size exceeds 550, the
estimates are not likely to change when the spectra series is included or
excluded.
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IX. A Description of Results
Two equations were initially estimated, one in which 6 is set to zero,
as if IBM were not thought to be unusual, and one in which 9 is estimated.
(
These are presented in table 7 and 8 respectively for samples (1) and (4)
(samples (2) and (3) did not differ significantly) . Below I summarize the
results and in the next section I assess their implications for the
different hypotheses about the role of oversight.
Characteristics of the choice: Table 7 and table 8 show that the presence
of an incumbent predicts that a buyer will choose that incumbent again. If
a buyer has had any experience with a supplier in the past, then that
supplier is likely to be chosen again in future acquisitions. If a buyer
has had experience with a supplier's systems in the past, then that
supplier is even more likely to be chosen in a future acquisition. As one
would expect, experience with a system is a better predictor than
experience with a piece of equipment.
In Table 7 the positive coefficient on the capacity variable provides
moderate support for the hypothesis that the extent of investment works to
an incumbent's favor, while the estimates suggest that dollar investment
with a supplier is a handicap. Both results lose their significance in
Table 8 when IBM is singled out as different, suggesting that the extent of
investment generally does not predict incumbent selection. The latter
conclusion is reinforced by the magnitude of the coefficients. Large
deviations in the extent of investment will not move the probability index
as much as the coefficient on the dummy variables indicating presence. Only
at the extreme values will these measures of the extent of experience
significantly influence the predicted probability of choice. 25
We see from Table 8 that buyers who had an IBM system on site were
less likely to procure an IBM system in their next purchase than buyers
with another vendor were to choose that vendor again. The estimates in ^
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Table 8 also provide moderate evidence that extensive investment with IBM
was a special handicap to IBM's sales. Hence, the evidence seems to support
the view that IBM benefits less from its incumbency than its rivals.
The market supply variable does not predict very well. This may be
attributed in part to coding problems; counting formerly RCA and GE systems
as Univac and Honeywell may incorrectly indicate that Univac and Honeywell
offer many systems. The measure could also be faulted for weighing all
systems equally within a market segment when other factors probably
indicate a firm's advantage in a market segment better.
In sum, the presence of an incumbent predicts choosing the incumbent
again, while the extent of that presence only sometimes predicts choosing
the incumbent. However, an IBM installed base was not as strong a predictor
of repeat purchases as the installed base was for the other major mainframe
vendors.
Characteristics of the chooser: While these estimates are not the central
focus of the estimation, it is clear that characteristics of the choosers
can significantly contribute to the probability of selecting a particular
vendor. Sometimes these factors outweigh those measuring the relative
effects of incumbency.
The coefficients of the influence of user characteristics are
estimated relative to Burroughs, and there are few surprises. Procurement
of dedicated applications statistically favors Univac and IBM relative to
Burroughs, but generally all the coefficients are numerically close.
Procurement of multi-processor systems favors IBM least, which is
consistent with the notion that IBM is most successful with off-the-shelf
single-processor systems for basic general purpose tasks. Procurement of
larger systems, even controlling for supply conditions, tends to give CDC a
relative advantage, while smaller systems favor Burroughs and Univac. These
results are not out of line with the relative advantages of these firms in
private industry reported in the trade press during this time period.
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X. Assessing the results
The estimates of ft and 9 thus have some zero elements and some non-
zero elements. Previous experience with an incumbent vendor does predict C
future choice. There is only a moderate link between the extent of
investment with a single incumbent and the next system supplier chosen. IBM
is distinctive and possibly disadvantaged. Most of the estimates in Table 8
have their predicted sign, even if they are not always significant.
Moreover, the four additional variables are jointly significant at the 1
percent level.
Xa. Accounting for product family
A reasonable concern is that IBM's distinctiveness may partly be an
artifact of the sampling period and many government agency's extensive
early investment in IBM equipment in the 1960s. That is, no industry
observer would expect IBM's incumbency to predict future success when an
office had old and not very upwardly compatible IBM equipment.
To determine whether the data are consistent with this alternative
explanation, equations (1) through (5) were estimated using information
about the incumbent IBM system as an additional element in X. The results
for sample 1 and sample 4 are reported in Table 9 (samples 2 and 3 do not
look much different) . Two dummy variables were tried: one that indicated
the presence of an incumbent system from the IBM 1400 series on site (just
over 40% of all acquisitions in which IBM is an incumbent) and one which
indicated when there was an incumbent system from the IBM 360/370 series on
site (just over two thirds of all acquisitions where IBM was an
incumbent) . Just over 10 percent of all acquisitions where IBM was an
incumbent had systems from both families. Only the estimates the 360/370
family dummy are reported, because it was found that this specification was
superior to the alternatives. 27
•
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The results have the same character in all samples. The IBM 360/370
dummy positively predicts purchasing from the incumbent again, in this
case, IBM. Moreover, the magnitude of the estimate is generally of the same
order as the disadvantage attributable to having IBM as an incumbent.
Hence, having an IBM 360/370 as an incumbent system predicted choosing IBM
about as often as incumbency of another vendor predicted choosing that
vendor again. 28 In contrast, the presence of an IBM system that was not
from the 360/370 series was not a good predictor of choosing IBM again. In
other words, when no system from the IBM 360/370 family is on site, it is
as if IBM were not a system incumbent at all.
Xb. Assessing the results
Table 9 shows that many factors influenced procurement choice. The
following discussion will argue that concerns with upward compatibility
likely dominated many of those choices. Thus, Table 9 provides the first
econometric evidence that incompatibilities between generations of products
influences competitive outcomes.
There is one interpretation of the results in Tables 7 and 8 and 9
that is consistent with the belief that switching costs influenced vendor
choice. If the majority of switching costs are one time set-up costs, e.g.
establishing the operating system and training personnel, then there is
little reason to expect them to correlate with the extent of investment by
a buyer. If this view is correct, then only the presence of an incumbent
should indicate that these complementary investments have been made. This
is, in fact, what was observed, although the coefficient also has other
interpretations.
Perhaps the easiest interpretation for the estimates in Table 9 is
that when an IBM 360/370 was on site, agencies typically did not want to
switch to another vendor and IBM gained an advantage as a consequence. When
an IBM 360/370 was not on site, there was less justification for staying
with the incumbent vendor and hence, IBM's competitors succeeded in winning
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bids more often. If this is correct, the perceived IBM disadvantage in
Table 8 (and in Table 2 and in Werling) is an artifact of the extensive
government investment in 1400 series eguipment in the early 1960s, which
did not translate into much of an advantage for IBM in the government
mainframe computer market of the 1970s. From this perception, IBM's
disadvantage is as much a result of incompatibilities in generations of
IBM's product line as it is a result of procurement procedures.
Another interpretation to these results also leads to the conclusion
that oversight was not harmful. For example, these results could be made
consistent with the view that government procurement procedures "levelled
the playing field," in the sense of ignoring conversion expenses. However,
such an interpretation is quite limited by the estimates in Table 9. If the
importance of switching costs was minimized in the selection process, then
the differences between sites that had IBM 360/370 family systems and those
that had other IBM systems should correlate with procurement needs that the
IBM models of the late 1970s were best able to meet. The IBM 360 had to be
even that much better than its rivals before the "procedural bias" set in.
Moreover, the 1400 dummy cannot correlate with those needs. Otherwise,
there is no other way that incumbency with an IBM 360/370 could produce a
significantly positive coefficient. In this interpretation, the alleged
disadvantaged to IBM from procurement procedures seems less harmful than
previously suggested, i.e. procedural biases against IBM were applied most
heavily when older generations of IBM eguipment were on site.
One final interpretation reconciles these results with all the
allegations about procedural bias against IBM, but it also leads to the
conclusion that oversight was not too harmful to IBM. It is very possible
that the allegations of bias, like those found in Werling (1983)
,
accurately describe several prominent and well-known acquisitions. However,
a few prominent cases need not reflect patterns in the vast majority of
acquisitions. In this view, IBM may have been disadvantaged, but not over
enough cases to affect the estimates much. This may explain why IBM is
still at a slight disadvantage relative to other vendors in Tables 8 and 9A .
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In other words, if the disadvantage to IBM operated solely through breaking
the link between switching costs and repeat buyer choice, then it was
mainly effective in only a few procurement cases. The fact that the
disadvantage was not widespread is demonstrated by the cases in which
IBM360/370 systems were incumbents and the disregard of switching costs
should have had the greatest impact.
There is no question that IBM was distinctive in this sample. Previous
investment with IBM systems that were not from the 360/370 family did not
yield as great an advantage for IBM as incumbent of 360/370 systems. In
addition, the presence of these systems on site did not benefit IBM in
subsequent procurement to the same extent that the presence of on-site
systems benefited other vendors. Nevertheless, it makes a world of
difference in the interpretation of that result if IBM's distinctiveness
resulted from regulations restricting consideration of conversion expenses
or from technical incompatibilities among IBM systems. Most probably, it
was a combination of both factors, though this experiment suggests that
concerns about incompatibility may have dominated overall.
Xc. Who had the Upper Hand?
Based on the evidence just presented, it is difficult to determine
unambiguously whether oversight of the procurement system restricted the
advantages of an incumbent. Any interpretation must reconcile the general
unimportance of the measures of the extent of investment with an incumbent
with the general importance of the coefficients measuring the presence of
an incumbent and with the significance of the 360/370 family dummy. The
former result indicates that the switching costs were probably not widely
important, while the latter two are consistent with the hypothesis that
they were. Yet, as already indicated, while these results do not settle all
open issues, they severely limit one's interpretation of the consequences
of oversight on computer procurement.
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On the presumption that agencies favored incumbents and that
preference was correlated with the extent of investment with the incumbent,
the agencies appear to be constrained. The constraint seemed to bind less
when agencies had new equipment with compatible upgrades, as with the
360/370 system. However, if one only expected switching costs to correlated
with the presence and not the extent of investment, then these results
quite plausibly demonstrate that agencies were able to choose an incumbent
supplier in situations where a compatible upgrade was available.
Two scenarios seem consistent with the estimates: (1) If overseers
sought to enforce bidding parity, they likely expended their limited
resources in situations where an agency was not likely to argue that
switching costs were high (as when a 1400 is on site); (2) If agencies
sought to expend their limited resources on cases they were more likely to
win, it was in situations when the presence of the incumbent led to
switching costs that justified using the incumbent again (as when a 360/370
was on site) . Either scenario leads to the conclusion that oversight did
not greatly influence vendor choices, and thus, was not as harmful as
previously thought.
XI. Summary
This paper analyzed a newly reconstructed history of federal agency
acquisitions of commercial general purpose mainframes. It investigated the
empirical relationship between incumbency and computer system vendor
choice. The work here also reconsidered whether federal computer
procurement procedures contributed to the relatively poor performance of
IBM equipment in Federal sales.
The analysis found that the presence of an incumbent, though not the
extent of that presence, predicted choosing that incumbent again. However,
IBM differed from its rivals. In contrast to previous conclusions (Werling
1983), further estimates suggested that IBM was disadvantaged as much by
the incompatibilities in generations of its product line as by any
m
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disadvantages stemming from bias in procurement procedures. Most probably a
combination of both factors operated, though this analysis suggests that
the concern about upward compatibility dominated. This provides the first
econometric evidence that incompatibilities between generations of products
influences competitive outcomes.
Any interpretation must reconcile the general unimportance of the
measures of the extent of investment with an incumbent with the general
importance of the coefficients measuring the presence of an incumbent and
with the significance of the 360/370 family dummy. The former two results
indicated that the switching costs were probably not widely important,
while the latter is consistent with the hypothesis that they were. Hence,
further work should attempt to estimates statistically coefficients
associated with choice among incompatible system families, in addition to
choice of suppliers. This might provide a test of the relevance of
advantages attributable to switching between incompatible systems, rather
than firms.
27
Appendix: The consistency of multi-nomial logit with bidding models.
This appendix shows how multi-nomial model can be made consistent with
a class of vendor bidding models. This appendix presents a bidding game
with two bidders. The model easily extends to multiple number of bidders. (
Two vendors bid to provide a system. The decision is made in two
stages. In the first stage vendors bid. In the second stage, winners are
chosen. Reflecting the uncertainty (to vendors) in the decision-making
process, at stage 1 vendors make estimates about the probability of winning
a bid under different conditions. All vendors use the same function to
estimate these probabilities. Prior to bidding, each vendor knows its own
and rival's costs. Each vendor also knows of its own and rival's
experience, if any, with the potential buyer. These structural assumptions
are easy justify based on actual procedures (Greenstein 1989, 1990).
Vendor's estimates of the probability of winning a bid are
(Al) Pr(l) = Pr(U
1
> U
2 ) ,
where the notation is the same as that used in the text. For simplicity of
illustration, parameterize eguation (Al) as
(A2) Pr(l) = exp(u
1
)/[exp(u
1
) + exp(u 2 )] /
where Pr(l) + Pr(2) = 1. The deterministic component is given by
(A3) Ul = [X, - P, - (X2 - P2 )],
where X
(
is the normalized advantage provided vendor i due to his
incumbency and/or superior product, and P
;
is the price bid by vendor i.
Other functional forms can suffice. 29
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Vendors are assumed to be risk neutral and maximize expected profit.
Since the important insight of this model does not depend on modelling the
participation constraint that results when bidding costs are large, assume
that there are no bidding costs. The Nash equilibrium to this game results
in vendors who bid according to the maximization of
(A4) P,* = argmax { [P 1 - C^Prfl)},
where C
1
is vendor l's cost of providing a system. A similar equation holds
for vendor 2. The equilibrium bid prices, P
1
and P
2
*, satisfy
(A5) [P, - CJPr' (1) + Pr(l) = 0,
[P
2
- C
2
]Pr'(2) + Pr(2) = 0.
Let Pr*(l) and Pr (2) equal the probabilities of choosing each vendor
with equilibrium bid prices. Total differentiation of (A5) and
straightforward calculations show that
(A6) dP
1
*/dX
1
> and dP
1
*/dX
2
< 0.
Hence, even accounting for equilibrium bidding behavior, an increase in the
relative advantage of a vendor results in a positive increase in the
probability that that vendor will be chosen. This is the basic structural
assumption underlying the estimation in the text.
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Endnotes
1. For a review of the relevant theoretical literature of
auctions and government contracting, see McAfee and McMillan
(1987) and (1988). Other papers of interest include Demski,
Sappington and Spiller (1987), and Anton and Yao (1987). Recent
empirical papers on procurement and auctions include Crocker
(1990), Crocker and Reynolds (1990), Lichtenberg (1988), Rogerson
(1989a, 1989b, 1990a, 1990b) and Kendricks and Porter (1989a,
1989b)
.
2. Previous work tends to examine a few cases very closely for
their general lessons. Excellent examples of case studies of
computer procurement include GAO (1980), NBS (1980), Werling
(1983) and Kelman (1990). For a summary of their implications for
the economics of switching costs, see Greenstein (1990).
3. See Greenstein (1989), data appendix, for detail about the
construction of this data set. Related papers that use this data
include Greenstein (1990). I would like to thank Professor Frank
Fisher, Martha Mulford Gray of NIST, and IBM corporation for help
in locating the last existing copy of this data.
4. This account is based on GSA (1987), GAO (1980), appendix, and
Kelman (1990), chapters 2 and 3.
5. Agencies have reasons to avoid having non-incumbent vendors
estimate their own switching costs if they want to prevent
outside contractors from doing the conversions. Since the
establishment of the Office of Software Development, the GSA has
as much in-house expertise in conversion as could probably be
found in the private market. In-house conversions will be
sensitive to the needs of the agency. Moreover, outside
conversions invariably leave much for the agency to do in-house
anyway. Finally, non-incumbent vendors are subject to "winner's
curse," underestimating the costs of conversion and winning the
bid, but learning later that the costs were higher than
anticipated, resulting in an "unnecessary switch." Agencies still
pay for the "unnecessary switch" because they must cover the
expenses associated with problems the outside conversion
personnel did improperly. These expenses can potentially be high.
See GAO (1981)
.
6. The case of an acquisition to replace an existing system
entails the highest switching costs. Switching costs do influence
initial mainframe acquisitions to the extent that buyers are
anticipating the problems associated with future purchases.
Switching costs also influence the decision to add a new system
to existing facilities in so far as personnel must be retrained
and new software must be written if the new system is
incompatible with the old. In a capacity addition, there is also
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the issue associated with loss of efficiency in joint-system
performance as a consequence of the lack of integration of the
systems
.
7. These competing interpretations are analogous to the
difficulties in labor econometrics between measuring "state-
dependance" and "unobserved heterogeneity" — see Heckman and
Singer, 1979.
8. Oversight has changed somewhat since the passage of the
Competition in Contracting Act (1984) . These changes are not
discussed because the paper's sample of acquisitions ends in
1983, before the Act was passed.
9. At the end of the 1970s, systematic conversion estimation
procedures were adopted (in principle) when it was clearly
demonstrated that tangible conversion expenses could be enormous
(GAO 1980) . However, it took some time to construct a systematic
and practical method for estimating conversion expenses (GSA
1986) . Thus, the discussion in the text about the absence of such
procedures is relevant to the sample of acquisitions examined in
the empirical section. These cover 1972 through 1983.
10. For an analysis of this debate, see Cabral and Greenstein
(1990). A summary can be found in Kelman (1990), pp. 103 -104.
11. It may also have been that restricting competition to IBM
compatible equipment was what prevented switching costs from
playing such a large role. In the context of a discussion about
the standardization that followed the introduction of the IBM
360, Werling says, "Standardization... with IBM setting the
standard, was disagreeable to many. HGOC, for example, refused to
allow GSA to consider as fully competitive a procurement limited
to the many vendors of IBM-compatible equipment."
12. Werling suggests that Brooks was motivated by a number of
factors. In the first place, he wished to promote industry
competitiveness. Second, IBM was undergoing an antitrust
investigations. Finally, Brooks may have misinterpreted the
idiosyncratic relationship between computer supplier and buyer as
rigged bidding. See Werling, page 177, 262 and the discussion
therein. Kelman (1990), page 8, states that Brooks worried that
lack of competition favored IBM, which motivated his drive for
more competitive procurement.
13. All systems marked "special government design" were
eliminated, as were all military systems with unrecognizable
names. The list of included systems closely parallels those in
International Data Corporation's General Purpose System surveys
from the 1970s with a few additions from Phister (1979). See
Greenstein (1989), data appendix.
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14. Government reports suggest, though they do not prove
conclusively, that it could partially be an artifact of
increasing replacement of the many small IBM systems (first
acguired in the early 1960s) by larger systems made by IBM, among
others. See NBS 1981, pages 1-11, for similar estimates and a
description of the trend away from smaller mainframes.
15. An office is what is literally called an "ADP Unit" in the
inventories. By all appearances, these are equivalent to agency
offices at individual locations.
16. See NBS 1983, chapter 5 for examples of the inaccuracy of
retirements.
17. See IDC Loyalty surveys, 12/18/74, 2/12/75, 12/8/75, 1/21/77,
12/5/78, 12/29/80 in the EDP Industry Report. There is a sample
selection problem with these surveys in that only buyers who
acquired a system are recorded and not the many users who chose
not to buy anything. A similar sample selection problem affects
the statistics above.
18. Though it was not essential, this was one factor for which a
quadratic term seemed justifiable. A quadratic term was
eventually tried and then dropped. It did not contribute
significantly to the loglikelihood function.
19. For example, an IBM 1400 falls in the size class 2, models
360/20 and 370/115 in size class 3, models 360/30, 40 and 44, and
370/125 and 135 in size 4, models 360/50 and 370/145 in size 5,
models 360/65 and 370/155 and 158 in size 6, and models 360/67,
75, 85, and 95, and 370/165, 168, and 195 in size 7.
20. Since most special government designs and other customized
systems have been eliminated from the sample, dedicated
applications include process control and other monitoring
applications that are not special to military or unique
government functions.
21. It is important not to confuse the definition of a system and
a processor. A processor is one component of a system and can be
made by a manufacturer other than the system designer. The
largest processor in a system tends to be from the system
designer.
22. Note that this recoding will not affect the coding of the
supply variable. In all cases, the percentage of the systems
offered by Honeywell and Univac is coded counting the formerly GE
and RCA systems with their new owners.
23. Note that such cases would also violate assumption 2.
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24. What this problem really points out is the difficulty of
investigating incumbent firms' advantages when the technical
sources of some of those advantages do not always cut across
firms. One may be able to improve on this in further work by
distinguishing between computer system families.
25. For example, even if each of the variables concurrently
increased by one standard deviation, the aggregate probability
wc .Id change by only 1.0 when IBM is not the incumbent (sample
1) . This compares with a dummy coefficient that is greater than
2.
26. Upward-compatibility issues were much less compelling when
switching from old IBM 1400 series and 7000 series computers to
the larger 360/370 families, the popular system of the 1970s.
While IBM did make an effort to provide 1400 users a way of
upgrading to the 360 series (Fisher, McGowan and Greenwood
,1983), their solution had its problems. IBM provided a program
that allowed a 360 to "emulate" a 1400 system's operating system.
Government auditors recommended redesigning a system rather than
relying on "emulators." Emulation was thought to be a poor long-
term solution because it did not efficiently use the new
hardware.
27. For Sample 4, the loglikelihood for estimates which added
only the 1400 dummy was -501.252, for only the 360/370 dummy -
494.374, and for both together -494.253. Adding the 360/370 dummy
clearly results in all the explanatory power that is necessary
and the 1400 is not statistically significant (by the Log ratio
test, for example).
28. IBM's advantages are just below those of other firms because
the full incumbent's advantages must also account for the extent
of investment with the incumbent. Since extensive investment with
IBM is estimated to be negative (though not significant) , the sum
of the estimates points to a slight diminished advantage for IBM
when an IBM 360/370 is the incumbent system.
29. For example, let Pr(l) = f[X
1
- P
1
- (X
2
- P
2 ) ]
. Then f >
and f" < is sufficient for what follows.
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Table 1
System Supplier for Stock of General Purpose Systems in the 1970s
MANU 71 72 73 74 75 76 77 78 79 83
AMD 1 1 3 10
BUR 204 201 202 213 201 189 187 209 218 286
CDC 148 166 190 208 201 217 220 222 208 191
CRY . . . . . . 1 1 4 7
DEC 20 23 28 29 34 43 51 56 71 244
GEL 81 98 97 93 95 89 82 78 68 21
HON 169 177 193 217 192 182 195 201 208 283
IBM 1205 1186 1166 1087 1044 924 923 897 819 661
NCR 287 235 213 118 101 100 101 97 96 37
RCA 157 169 161 125 106 87 83 75 64 30
SIN . 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
UNI 708 734 706 708 680 624 619 658 664 578
XDS 50 63 70 81 82 90 94 91 87 46
Source: Federal ADP Equipment Inventory, 1971-1979, 1983, original
data. See GSA ADP Activities Summary, various years, and Gray (1977)
,
(1978), (1979), and (1981), and Greenstein (1987) for summaries and detail
Also see pages 1 - 11 of NBS 1981 for similar estimates.
Notes: The table includes only commercially available general purpose
mainframe systems, as defined by IDC EDP industry reports (various years)
,
and Digital Equipment Corporation VAX systems. The table only includes
acquisition of federally owned or leased systems from external supplier.
RCA and GE systems retain the designing firm's label, and not that of
Univac or Honeywell. No effort was made to check for consistent use of
either the original or the acquiring firm's name for an RCA or GE system.
Hence, these number probably understate RCA and GE systems sales somewhat.
Table 2
Commercially Available General Purpose Mainframe Systems
Acquired Each Year From External Suppliers by Federal Agencies
Manu 72 73 74 75 76 77 78 79 80-83 Total
AMD 1 2 7 10
BUR 39 15 19 4 22 8 37 23 87 254
CDC 22 25 25 11 29 6 9 9 33 169
CRY 2 4 6
DEC 3 7 4 5 12 5 4 16 183 239
GEL 21 8 1 2 5 1 2 40
HON 13 24 54 12 26 16 12 33 152 342
IBM 57 69 79 43 77 26 26 24 157 558
NCR 1 1 2 3 4 1 2 22 34
RCA 14 5 7 11 2 1 2 43
SIN 1 1 2
UNI 114 57 74 41 48 25 47 42 65 513
XDS 11 9 14 3 20 4 2 1 64
Total 296 220 279 132 244 97 140 154 720 2282
Notes: Acquisitions were estimated by comparing systems at Federal agency
offices in adjacent inventory years. Year is the year the first processor
for a system first appeared in the data inventories. Due to unavailability
of original data for years 1980, 1981, and 1982, all acquisitions in these
years were estimated from inventories for 1983.
The table may overestimate total acquisitions if all intra and inter
agency transfers are not recorded, but internal consistency checks revealed
that this problem is not likely to be large.
For reasons mentioned in the notes to Table 1, it is also true here
that these values for the RCA and GE sales over the 1970s are probably
underestimates of the total number of sales. Some may have been labelled
for their acquiring firms, Univace or Honeywell.
Table 3
Acquisitions from External Sources at Single Vendor Sites
for Major Mainframe Vendors.
(Number acquired and percent loyal to incumbent)
ACQUIRED
VENDOR
INCUMBENT SYSTEM VENDOR
AMD BUR CDC DEQ GEL HON IBM NCR RCA UNI XDS
AMD
1 4
BUR
100% 1.3%
15 4 1 1 1 65 1 1
CDC
60% 15% 4.5% 4.5% 1.8% 21% 6.6% 6.6%
12 2 1 7
CRY
46% 9. 1% 1 . o "6 2.2*5
1
DEQ
3.8%
3 12 4 10 1 2
GEL/
HON
12% 54% 7.3% 3.2% 1.1% 100%
7 2 3 21 46 22 7 3 8
IBM
28% 7.7 13% 95% 84% 6.9% 46% 20% 9.2%
1 3 3 2 175 3 14
NCR
4.0% 12% 13% 3.6% 56% 20% 16%
1 2 7 1
RCA/
UNI
4.0% .6% 47% 6.7%
1 1 1 1 25 10 66
4.0% 3.8% 4.5% 1.8% 8.0% 47% 73%
Note: General Electric acquisitions were combined with Honeywell, and RCA ™
acquisitions with Sperry-Univac because of mergers and inconsistency in the
coding of system manufacturers for formerly GE and RCA systems.
Table 4
Summary of Model and Predictions
(1) U r = Uj • + e.. , where i = { observation },
j = { Burroughs, Control Data, Honeywell, IBM, and Univac }
(2) If f( e,j ) = exp(-exp (-e,..)) , and
Pr^B) = Pr
;
( U jB > U jc , U iB > UiH , ...) and so on,
then Pr-(j) = exp(u,..)/[S
k
exp(u.
k )], SjPr,- (j) = 1.
(3) LL = SjS i Yu -log { Z k [exp(u jk - u^.)]'
1
),
(4) If j is the incumbent, j ^ IBM then u f , = a + X { -& + 1^6 ]t
(5) If IBM is the incumbent then u fj = a + X^- (3 + 6) + Z,5,,
X r is a measure of incumbent advantages and supply effect. These
characteristic affect all choices equally.
Zj is a measure of differnt types of buyers. These characteristic affect
all choices differently.
Definitions of variables are given in Table 5.
Category of Variable Prediction List of Variables
3, influence of
previous experience
on choice of vendor
positive (?)
in an
unsupervised
procurement
INVEST, INCUMBSYS
COMPCAP, INCEQUIP,
PERCENTSYS
negative MINAGE
9, influence of IBM
characteristics
opposite of
above if
IBM is
disadvantaged
INVEST IBM, MINAGE IBM
COMPCAP IBM,
INCUMBSYS IBM
<5 • - 6 Q , influence of
buyer characterisitcs
will vary DEDAPP, DUMMULTI, SIZE
DUMAIRFAORCE, DUMNAVY
,
DUMARMY, DUMTCA, SUMCPU
Table 5
Exogenous variables and their definitions.
The unit of observation is an acquisition for an agency office
Abbreviation Definition
Characteristics of the Choice
INVEST
MINAGE
COMPCAP
INCUMBSYS
INCEQUIP
PERCENTSYS
Dollar investment in incumbent vendor
Age of the youngest system on site
Number of systems weighted by average
site size
Vendor previously had a system on site
Vendor previously had any equipment on
site
Percentage of systems in market class
offered by vendor
Factors affecting IBM only
INVEST IBM
MINAGE IBM
COMPCAP IBM
INCUMBSYS IBM
Dollar investment in IBM
Age of the youngest IBM system on site
Number of IBM systems weighted by average
site size
IBM previously had a system on site
Factors affecting vendors differently
DEDAPP
DUMMULTI
DUMARMY
DUMAIRFORCE
DUMNAVY
DUMTCA
SUMCPU
SIZE
System is bought for dedicated application
(vs. General purpose)
System is bought for multi-processor
application
System is bought by US Army office
System is bought by US Air Force office
System is bought by US Navy office
System is bought by Traditional Civilian
agency (non-military, not NASA nor Energy)
Number of processors on site
IDC size class of requested system
Table 6
Means, Standard Deviations, Minimums and Maximums for Sample Number 1
Characteristics
MEAN
of the Ch<
STD DEV MINIMUM MAXIMUM
}XCG
INVEST 11.47 27.76 0.00 253.94
COMPCAP 10.06 20. 17 0.00 121.99
MINAGE 2.474 2.44 0.00 13.00
INCUMBSYS BUR 0.039 0.19 0.00 1.00
INCUMBSYS CDC 0.051 0.22 0.00 1.00
INCUMBSYS HON 0. 100 0.30 0.00 1.00
INCUMBSYS IBM 0.524 0.50 0.00 1.00
INCUMBSYS UNI 0. 165 0.37 0.00 1.00
INCEQUIP BUR 0.069 0.25 0.00 1.00
INCEQUIP CDC 0.076 0.27 0.00 1.00
INCEQUIP HON 0. 121 0.33 0.00 1.00
INCEQUIP IBM 0.964 0.19 0.00 1.00
INCEQUIP UNI 0. 364 0.48 0.00 1.00
PERCENTSYS BUR 0.089 0.039 0.021 0.200
PERCENTSYS CDC 0. 118 0.114 0.000 0.347
PERCENTSYS HON 0.209 0.059 0.088 0.311
PERCENTSYS IBM 0. 196 0.065 0. 109 0.434
PERCENTSYS UNI
Factors affectii
0. 191
ig vendors
0.046 0.086 0.264
uirrerenuiy
DEDAPPL 0. 13 0.34 0.00 1.00
DUMMULTI 0. 18 0.38 0.00 1.00
DUMDEF 0.70 0.45 0.00 1.00
DUMTCA 0.26 0.44 0.00 1.00
DUMACQDA 0.37 0.48 0.00 1.00
DUMACQDF 0. 11 0.32 0.00 1.00
DUMACQDN 0. 16 0.37 0.00 1.00
SUMCPU 4.47 8.15 1.00 45.00
SIZE 4.44 1.37 2.00 7.00
Note: Sample 1 contains no acquisitions or incumbents labelled RCA or GE.
The means, standard deviations, minimums and maximums will differ slightly
for samples 2, 3 and 4, which do contain formerly RCA and GE systems.
Table 7
Coefficient Estimates for Constrained Experiment
(Standard Errors in Parentheses)
Sample 1 Sample 4
NUMBER BUR ACQUISITIONS 93 95
NUMBER CDC ACQUISITIONS 32 32
NUMBER HON ACQUISITIONS 106 137
NUMBER IBM ACQUISITIONS 230 233
NUMBER UNI ACQUISITIONS 98 116
LOGLIKELIHOOD -454.446 -527.976
NUMBER OF OBSERVATIONS
Characteristic of choice
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INVEST -0.009** -0.009*
(0.005) (0.004)
MINAGE -0.062 -0.021
(0.048) (0.042)
COMPCAP 0.049** 0.05 **
(0.023) (0.02 )
INCUMBSYS 1.73 ** 1.77 **
(0.28 ) (0.25 )
INCEQUIP 1.18 ** 0.82 **
(0.26 ) (0.23 )
PERCENTSYS -2.41 ** -0.44
(1.22 ) (1.12 )
*
**
T-statistic greater than 1.64
T-statistic greater than 1.96
Sample defined at the end of the table
Table 7 continued
Factors affecting vendors di:
CONSTANT CDC
l Lcrciiuiy
-9.36 **
-8.71 **
(1.85 ) (1.82 )
DEDAPPL CDC 1.26 1.30
(1.16 ) (1.12 )
DUMMULTI CDC -1.47 ** -1.47 **
(0.75 ) (0.73 )
DUMARMY CDC -2.30 ** -2.40 **
(1.01 ) (0.97 )
DUMAIRFORCE C -3.00 ** -3.41 **
(1.49 ) (1.46 )
DUMNAVY CDC -1.85 ** -2.07 *
(1.09 ) (1.07 )
DUMTCA CDC -2.23 ** -2.45 **
(1.07 ) (1.07 )
SUMCPU CDC 0.08 0.07
(0.05 ) (0.05 )
SIZE CDC 2.12 ** 2.01 **
(0.31 ) (0.31 )
CONSTANT HON -4.31 ** -3.99 **
(1.17 ) (1.09 )
DEDAPPL HON 0.42 0.53
(0.75 ) (0.69 )
DUMMULTI HON -0.81 -1.00 *
(0.56 ) (0.54 )
DUMARMY HON -0.96 -0.96
(0.88 ) (0.82 )
DUMAIRFORCE H -1.48 -2.01 *
(1.13 ) (1.09 )
DUMNAVY HON -0.03 -0.32
(0.91 ) (0.87 )
DUMTCA HON -0.13 -0.32
(0.92 ) (0.87 )
SUMCPU HON -0.01 -0.02
(0.05 ) (0.05 )
SIZE HON 1.24 ** 1.23 **
(0.18 ) (0.18 )
*
**
T-statistic greater than 1.64
T-statistic greater than 1.96
Sample defined at the end of the table.
Table 7 continued
CONSTANT IBM -3.79 ** -3 . 85 **
(1.09 ) (1.06 )
DEDAPPL IBM 1.58 ** 1.56 **
(0.59 ) (0.58 )
DUMMULTI IBM -2.13 ** -2.19 **
(0.56 ) (0.55 )
DUMARMY IBM -1.34 * -1.47 *
(0.83 ) (0.81 )
DUMAIRFORCE I -3.03 ** -3.18 **
(1.11 ) (1.09 )
DUMNAVY IBM -1.12 -1.05
(0.87 ) (0.86 )
DUMTCA IBM -0.31 -0.57
(0.87 ) (0.87 )
SUMCPU IBM -0.01 -0.01
(0.04 ) (0.04 )
SIZE IBM 1.05 ** 1.10 **
(0.16 ) (0.17 )
CONSTANT UNI -2.58 ** -2.07 *
(1.26 ) (1.14 )
DEDAPPL UNI 1.89 ** 1.50 **
(0.65 ) (0.62 )
DUMMULTI UNI 0.55 0.46
(0.58 ) (0.54 )
DUMARMY UNI -1.90 * -1.66 *
(1.98 ) (0.99 )
DUMAIRFORCE U 0.36 -0.04
(1.07 ) (1.00 )
DUMNAVY UNI -1.01 -1.22
(1.03 ) (0.96 )
DUMTCA UNI 0.30 0.26
(0.99 ) (0.92 )
SUMCPU UNI 0.04 0.03
(0.04 ) (0.04 )
SIZE UNI 0.51 ** 0.47 **
(0.20 ) (0.19 )
*
**
T-statistic greater than 1.64
T-statistic greater than 1.96
Note: Sample 1 excludes acquisitions or incumbents labelled GE or RCA.
Sample 4 relabels all GE and RCA acquisitions and incumbents as
Honeywell and Univac.
Table 8
Coefficient Estimates for Unconstrained Experiment
(Standard Errors in Parentheses)
Sample 1 Sample 4
NUMBER BUR ACQUISITIONS 93 95
NUMBER CDC ACQUISITIONS 32 32
NUMBER HON ACQUISITIONS 106 137
NUMBER IBM ACQUISITIONS 230 233
NUMBER UNI ACQUISITIONS 98 116
LOGLIKELIHOOD -446.493 -517.615
NUMBER OF OBSERVATIONS 559 613
Characteristic of choice
INVEST 0.009 0.007
(0.014) (0.01 )
MINAGE -0.18 ** -0.055
(0.088) (0.067)
COMPCAP 0.03 0.06
(0.05 ) (0.05 )
INCUMBSYS 2.90 ** 2.56 **
(0.55 ) (0.45 )
INCEQUIP 0.73 ** 0.38
(0.32 ) (0.27 )
PERCENTSYS -2.02 * 0.03
(1.21 ) (1.11 )
T*1 a /** 4" /"\ T" o a ^ ^ a /* 4~ t v\ /** T T3 lUT f\v\ 1 tt£clg\-\ji.& QiitiCLiny ion only
INVEST IBM -0.025* -0.021
(0.015) (0.015)
COMPCAP IBM 0.01 -0.03
(0.06 ) (0.06 )
MINAGE IBM 0.17 0.044
(0.11 ) (0.087)
INCUMBSYS IBM -1.78 ** -1.40 **
(0.69 ) (0.59 )
*
**
T-statistic greater than 1.64
T-statistic greater than 1.96
Sample defined at the end of the table
Table 8 continued
Factors affecting vendors di c ierentiy
CONSTANT CDC -9.20 ** -8.37 **
(1.91 ) (1.88 )
DEDAPPL CDC 1.41 1.58
(1.20 ) (1. 16 )
DUMMULTI CDC -1.34 * -1.32 *
(0.80 ) (0.77 )
DUMARMY CDC -2.08 ** -2.27 **
(1.05 ) (1.02 )
DUMAIRFORCE C -2.48 * -2.90 **
(1.47 ) (1.45 )
DUMNAVY CDC -2.08 * -2.37 **
(1.21 ) (1.19 )
DUMTCA CDC -2.30 ** -2.50 **
(1.11 ) (1.08 )
SUMCPU CDC 0.03 0.03
(0.09 ) (0.09 )
SIZE CDC 2.07 ** 1.93 **
(0.32 ) (0.32 )
CONSTANT HON -4.73 ** -4.44 **
(1.22 ) (1. 15 )
DEDAPPL HON 0.47 0.60
(0.75 ) (0.70 )
DUMMULTI HON -0.74 -0.94 *
(0.58 ) (0.56 )
DUMARMY HON -0.68 -0.75
(0.91 ) (0.86 )
DUMAIRFORCE H -1.25 -1.79
(1.15 ) (1.11 )
DUMNAVY HON -0.21 -0.15
(0.94 ) (0.90 )
DUMTCA HON 0.03 -0.20
(0.94 ) (0.90 )
SUMCPU HON -0.02 -0.04
(0.06 ) (0.05 )
SIZE HON 1.28 ** 1.28 **
(0.20 ) (0.18 )
* T-statistic greater than 1.64
** T-statistic greater than 1.96
Sample defined at the end of the table
Table 8 continued
CONSTANT IBM -3.21 ** -3.11 **
(1.14 ) (1.11 )
DEDAPPL IBM 1.45 ** 1.40 **
(0.58 ) (0.58 )
DUMMULTI IBM -2.09 ** -2.16 **
(0.56 ) (0.56 )
DUMARMY IBM -1.22 -1.38 *
(0.85 ) (0.82 )
DUMAIRFORCE I -2.97 ** -3.16 **
(1.11 ) (1.09 )
DUMNAVY IBM -1.10 -1.07
(0.88 ) (0.87 )
DUMTCA IBM -0.24 -0.51
(0.88 ) (0.87 )
SUMCPU IBM 0.01 -0.01
(0.04 ) (0.04 )
SIZE IBM 1.06 ** 1.11 **
(0.17 ) (0.17 )
CONSTANT UNI -2.50 * -2.04 *
(1.31 ) (1.24 )
DEDAPPL UNI 1.70 ** 1.42 **
(0.66 ) (0.62 )
DUMMULTI UNI 0.64 0.61
(0.61 ) (0.57 )
DUMARMY UNI -1.94 * -1.57
(1.02 ) (0.99 )
DUMAIRFORCE U 0.32 -0.04
(1.10 ) (1.08 )
DUMNAVY UNI -0.88 -1.06
(1.06 ) (1.03 )
DUMTCA UNI 0.39 0.46
(1.02 ) (0.99 )
SUMCPU UNI 0.04 0.02
(0.04 ) (0.04 )
SIZE UNI 0.50 ** 0.42 **
(0.21 ) (0.20 )
*
**
T-statistic greater than 1.64
T-statistic greater than 1.96
Note: Sample 1 excludes acguisitions or incumbents labelled GE or RCA,
Sample 4 relabels all GE and RCA acguisitions and incumbents as
Honeywell and Univac.
Table 9
Coefficient Estimates for Unconstrained Experiment with IBM 360/370 Dummy
(Standard Errors in Parentheses)
Sample 1 Sample 4
NUMBER BUR ACQUISITIONS 93 95
NUMBER CDC ACQUISITIONS 32 32
NUMBER HON ACQUISITIONS 106 137
NUMBER IBM ACQUISITIONS 230 233
NUMBER UNI ACQUISITIONS 98 116
LOGLIKELIHOOD -422.641 -493.569
NUMBER OF OBSERVATIONS 559 613
Characteristic of choice
INVEST 0. 008 0.006
(0.013) (0.01 )
MINAGE -0.18 **
-0.053
(0.089) (0.067)
COMPCAP 0.02 0.058
(0.05 ) (0.046)
INCUMBSYS 2.84 ** 2.53 **
(0.55 ) (0.45 )
INCEQUIP 0.80 ** 0.43
(0.32 ) (0.27 )
PERCENTSYS
-1.14 0.94
(1.26 ) (1.15 )Factors af fpp^i nrr TRM rm 1 \r
INVEST IBM
-0.02
-0.016
(0.015) (0.015)
COMPCAP IBM
-0.02
-0.064
(0.05 ) (0.056)
MINAGE IBM 0.27 0.14
(0.11 ) (0.09 )
INCUMBSYS IBM
-3.31 **
-2.93 **
(0.73 ) (0.64 )
IBM 360/370 INCUMBENT 2.36 ** 2.27 **
(0.36 ) (0.35 )
*
**
T-statistic greater than 1.64
T-statistic greater than 1.96
Sample defined at the end of the table.
Table 9 continued
Factors affecting vendors di l r erenciy
CONSTANT CDC -8.81 -7.94 **
(1.93 ) (1.89 )
DEDAPPL CDC 1.09 1.30
(1.21 ) (1.17 )
DUMMULTI CDC -1.41 * -1.35 *
(0.80 ) (0.77 )
DUMARMY CDC -1.94 * -2.16 **
(1.05 ) (1.03 )
DUMAIRFORCE C -2.69 * -3.10 **
(1.48 ) (1.46 )
DUMNAVY CDC -2.26 * -2.54 **
(1.22 ) (1.21 )
DUMTCA CDC -2 . 40 ** -2.63 **
(1.11 ) (1.09 )
SUMCPU CDC 0.02 0.03
(0.09 ) (0.09 )
SIZE CDC 2.00 ** 1.85 **
(0.32 ) (0.32 )
CONSTANT HON -4.85 ** -4.57 **
(1.24 ) (1.18 )
DEDAPPL HON 0.20 0.35
(0.75 ) (0.70 )
DUMMULTI HON -0.78 -0.95 *
(0.59 ) (0.57 )
DUMARMY HON -0.55 -0.63
(0.92 ) (0.86 )
DUMAIRFORCE H -1.38 -1.93 *
(1.16 ) (1.12 )
DUMNAVY HON -0.12 -0.23
(0.94 ) (0.91 )
DUMTCA HON -0.01 -0.25
(0.95 ) (0.91 )
SUMCPU HON -0.03 -0.04
(0.05 ) (0.05 )
SIZE HON 1.29 ** 1.29 **
(0.20 ) (0.19 )
*
**
T-statistic greater than 1.64
T-statistic greater than 1.96
Sample defined at the end of the table.
Table 9 continued
CONSTANT IBM -2.84 ** -2.73 **
(1.17 ) (1.13 )
DEDAPPL IBM 1.22 ** 1.23 **
(0.59 ) (0.59 )
DUMMULTI IBM -2.34 ** -2.34 **
(0.59 ) (0.57 )
DUMARMY IBM -0.82 -1.01
(0.87 ) (0.85 )
DUMAIRFORCE I -3.18 ** -3.53 **
(1.13 ) (1.11 )
DUMNAVY IBM -0.90 -0.85
(0.90 ) (0.89 )
DUMTCA IBM -0.06 -0.35
(0.90 ) (0.88 )
SUMCPU IBM -0.01 -0.01
(0.04 ) (0.04 )
SIZE IBM 0.93 ** 0.97 **
(0.18 ) (0.17 )
CONSTANT UNI -2.29 * -1.83
(1.33 ) (1.25 )
DEDAPPL UNI 1.41 ** 1.20 **
(0.65 ) (0.63 )
DUMMULTI UNI 0.64 0.63
(0.61 ) (0.58 )
DUMARMY UNI -1.81 * -1.50
(1.03 ) (0.99 )
DUMAIRFORCE U 0.28 -0.18
(1.09 ) (1.08 )
DUMNAVY UNI -0.96 -1. 15
(1.06 ) (1.04 )
DUMTCA UNI 0.32 0.39
(1.02 ) (1.00 )
SUMCPU UNI 0.03 0.01
(0.04 ) (0.04 )
SIZE UNI 0.45 ** 0.37 *
(0.21 ) (0.20 )
*
**
T-statistic greater than 1.64
T-statistic greater than 1.96
Note: Sample 1 excludes acquistions or incumbents labelled GE or RCA.
Sample 4 relabels all GE and RCA acquisitions and incumbents as
Honeywell and Univac.
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